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HEALTH AND HOUSING IN VICTORIAN LONDON
M. J. Daunton
I
In January 1908, the council ofthe London borough ofIslington met to consider a
report from the Medical Officer of Health which indicated that the level of infant
mortality was the same as in the 1840s, 146 per 1,000. A resolution was moved that
three paid health visitors should be appointed as part of a campaign to reduce this
heavy toll; also before the council was a protest from the Holloway and District
Ratepayers Association against such a scheme. The motion was lost by 36 votes to 17.
"The spectacle before them", remarked Alderman Mills, "was that of a Council
haggling with a grizzly skeleton while they clutched at the money bags to see if they
could save a sovereign".1
This minor incident in the council chamber ofone North London borough raises a
major issue concerning the relationship between health and housing, for housing had
two identities which could come into conflict in their impact upon urban health. A
house was not only a place ofresidence that might be more or less salubrious, it also
provided the basis ofthe system oflocal-government finance and hence a large part of
the income for improvements in the urban environment which were designed to make
London more healthy. Rates fell particularly heavily on the owners ofhouse property.
A merchant ora solicitor or shopkeeper paid rates on the office or store fromwhich he
ranhisbusiness, butthis sumwas notdirectlyrelated toincome orturnover, andmight
form a small proportion of his total costs. It was different for a landlord who was
paying ataxdirectlyrelated to hisincome.2Theremighttherefore beatension between
increasing rates to finance better sanitation, and a mounting fiscal burden on rented
houses. The incidence ofthe ratesmight fall upon the owners, so squeezing theirprofit
margins and making them disinclined to keep property repaired or to provide
additional accommodation; orthe incidencemightfall upon the tenants, inwhich case
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pressure was placed on working-class incomes. This tension between the two facets of
housing in relation to health-as a place of residence and the basis of local
finance-had become very clear by the late-Victorian period, and culminated in an
Edwardian crisis in the London property market.
The debate on The bitter cry ofoutcast London in the early 1880s, which produced
the Royal Commission on the HousingoftheWorkingClasses, ledmanytoaccept that
in order to maintain the health ofthe majority ofthe population, it might be necessary
to set aside the property rights ofthe few who provided rented accommodation to the
workingclass. The Marquis ofSalisbury, the leadingadvocate ofthe appointment ofa
Royal Commission and subsequently Conservative Prime Minister, caused alarm in
some quarters in 1883 when he advocated cheap state loans to encourage the work of
the philanthropic housing trusts, and stricter sanitary regulation of suburban
development. Parliament, he pointed out, allowed the provision of new streets,
railways, and public buildings in London which swept away the homes ofthe poor; in
this case it was quite right for Parliament to intervene to increase the supply of
accommodation. "Laissezfaire is an admirable doctrine; but it must be applied on
both sides."3 Thisappeared to some to beinsidious socialism: the Liberty and Property
Defence League, which was formed in 1882, preferred to argue that problems were
created by government over-regulation, and expressed alarm at the possible extension
of state control into wider aspects ofworking-class life. The League, associated with
the opposition to "medical despotism" in mid-Victorian Britain, drew upon the
supporters of the Personal Rights Association, which had in turn emerged from the
campaign against the Contagious Diseases Acts, and which also opposed the
compulsory vaccination laws of 1853 and after. The League supported "free labour"
against trade unions, and opposed the extension of municipal trading through
municipal ownership ofpublic utilities.4 The League did not achieve much support, a
fact which had alarming prospects for the house-owners, for whom housing was more
than an aspect ofthe sanitary problem; houses were to them an economic activity in
their own right, and one of great significance.
The word "landlord" usually summons up the vision of such rapacious villains as
Sartorius in Shaw's Widower's Houses, who, living in the comfort ofSurbiton with its
gravel soils and low death rate, sent rent collectors like the despised Lickcheese to the
East End to extort money from the poor. "Look at that bag ofmoney on the table",
Lickcheese demands ofSartorius in the scene at the heart ofthe play, "Hardly a penny
ofthat but there was a hungry child crying for the bread it would have bought".5 The
same vision appeared in a Punch cartoon of 1883, at the height ofthe concern about
"outcast London": a bloated and over-fed rent collector bearing a bag labelled '50 per
3 For the debate on The bitter cry and the Royal Commission on the Housing ofthe Working Classes, see
the divergent views of G. Stedman Jones, Outcast London: a stud) in the relationship betwveen classes in
Victorian society, Oxford University Press, 1971, ch. 11; and A. S. Wohl. The eternal slum: housing and
socialpolicy in Victorian London, London, Edward Arnold, 1977, chs 8 and 9. Salisbury's intervention in
the debate is reprinted in A. S. Wohl (ed.), Andrew Mearns, The bitter cr! ofoutcast London, wvith leading
articles.from the Pall Mall Gazette ofOctober 1883 and articles by, Lord Salibury, Joseph Chamberlaiin and
Forster Crozier, Leicester University Press, 1970.
4 Wohl, Eternalslum, 231-4; E. J. Bristow, 'The Liberty and Property Defence League and individualism',
Hist. J., 1975, 18: 761-89.
5 G. Bernard Shaw, The complete plaj's of George Bernard Shaw, London, Odhams, 1934, 1-28.
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cent' faces a working man, his bedraggled wife and children in a room whose only
decoration is a price list for the manufacture ofmatch-boxes at 2kd. a gross. "Now,
then, my man; week's hup! Can't 'ave a 'ome without paying for it, yer know!"6 This
view of "Mammon's rents" was no doubt part of the truth, but it must always be
remembered that it was only part.
Although there were some large-scale owners like Sartorius, much more typical of
the owners ofsmall house property in Victorian London were members of the petty
bourgeoisie oreven themore prosperous artisans, who bought a fewhouses to provide
an income and security for themselves in old age and for their dependents after their
death. They were attracted by local investments, which were concrete and visible, and
appeared to offer greater security than the bonds and stocks preferred by wealthier
members ofsociety. Thefewhouses owned by thesepeoplewereofgreatimportance in
the life-cycles of their families; the best analogy would be a pension fund.7 The
problem, however, was that housing was not only in its own right an economic asset
that was expected to provide an income to its owner: it was also a precondition for
other economic activities. Poor housing conditions could mean an inefficient and
unproductive work-force, with a high incidence ofdisease and death. Thishad become
obvious from the 1840s, when the firstcontrols on housing standards were imposed in
such provincial towns as Liverpool, and which were extended and codified in the
Public Health Acts, most obviously that of 1875.8 The legislation in London was
different from the provinces, for the metropolis had Building Acts dating back to the
seventeenth century following the Great Fire, which had been consolidated in the
London Building Act of 1774. This Act was essentially concerned with limiting the
spread of fire, preventing encroachments into the streets, and controlling dangerous
structures; it was not concerned with matters of health. Nevertheless, it was an
important precedent forpubliccontrol overbuilding in towns, and formed the basis of
the first, albeit unsuccessful, attempts to create a national building code in 1841.
Although the national legislation did not pass, the Metropolitan Building Act of 1844
did incorporate into London legislation some ofthe proposals which had emerged in
thedebate, such ascontrols over streetwidths, obnoxious trades, and habitablecellars.
Drainage and sanitation were still excluded, and it was in 1855 that this shortcoming
was rectified, with the Metropolis Local Management Act. TheMetropolitan Building
Act hadconsolidated and modified the technical building regulations, and the new Act
6 Punch, 10 November 1883, reproduced in H. J. Dyos, 'The slums of Victorian London', Victorian
Studies, 1967, 11: 21.
7See R. J. Morris, 'The middle class and the property cycle during the industrial revolution', in T. C.
Smout (ed.), The searchfor wealth and stability, London, Macmillan, 1979, 91-3; and idem, 'The middle
class and British towns and cities of the industrial revolution, 1780-1870', in D. Fraser and A. Sutcliffe
(eds), The pursuit ofurban history, London, Edward Arnold, 1983, 295.
8 On the introduction ofcontrols in Liverpool, see A. Errazurez, 'Some types ofhousing in Liverpool,
1785-1890', Town Planning Review, 1943-7, 19: 59-68; and 1. C. Taylor, 'The insanitary housing question
and tenement dwellings in nineteenth-century Liverpool', in A. Sutcliffe (ed.), Multi-storey living: the
British working-class experience, London, Croom Helm, 1974. The national development is described in R.
Harper, Victorian building regulations. summary tables of the principal English building acts and model
bye-laws, 1840-1914, London, Mansell, 1985; and S. M. Gaskell, Building control: national legislation and
the introduction of local bye-laws in Victorian England, London, British Association for Local History,
1983.
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controlled cellars, streets, and drainage. Where London lagged behind the provinces
was in control over such matters as damp-proofcourses, underfloor ventilation, and
composition of mortar; the legislation remained somewhat inflexible in the face of
change, and was much less responsive than the building by-laws which were being
introduced inprovincial towns. London wasexcluded from the operation ofthePublic
Health Act of 1875, which codified powers relating to these by-laws, and was not
covered by these model by-laws of 1877 issued by the Local Government Board.
Although the London Acts were amended on a number ofoccasions, it was not until
1894 that acomprehensive London Building Act regulated the metropolis to the same
standard asotherEnglish towns.9 Ofcourse, muchofthe newhousingwasconstructed
in areas like West Ham, which fell outside the area ofthe London Building Acts and
came within the scope of the Public Health Act. There was a problem with these
regulations, that by improving housing standards, rent levels might be pushed above
working-class incomes, and produce sub-letting forwhich self-contained single-family
houses were not designed. At the same time as standards were pushed up, housing had
to bear the burden ofthe rates, which paid for such major improvements in the public
health ofLondon as the new main drainage system designed by Joseph Bazalgette for
the Metropolitan Board of Works.10 In this lay the potential for conflict between
housing as an investment earning a reasonable return, and as a precondition for other
economic activities requiring a healthy work-force.
This conflict was to remain potential, rather than actual during much of the
Victorian period, when it was possible for housing standards to improve and for the
level ofexpenditure on local government to rise without an insuperable threat to the
owners ofsmall house property. This was for two main reasons, namely the buoyancy
in both the rate base and in working-class incomes. During a period of rapid urban
growth such as the mid-nineteenth century, it was possible for the expansion of the
rateable value oftowns to keep pace, or at least to catch up with, the need for costly
interventions in the urban environment. London did, it is true, have a particular
problem because ofthe variation between prosperous areas with high rateable value
and low outgoings, and poor areas with low rateable value and high outgoings, which
led to schemes to "equalize" the rates ofvarious parts ofthe metropolis which started
in 1867.11 Thiswasessentially a matter foradministrative reform, but by theend ofthe
nineteenth century something more than an equalization of rates between areas was
required; what was needed was achange in the basis oflocal government finance away
fromsmallhouseproperty to othersources ofincome,which wasamuchmoredifficult
issue. The problem had arisen because of a lower rate of growth of rateable value,
which accompanied theend ofrapid urbanization and the displacement ofpopulation
to areas outside thelimits ofthe LondonCountyCouncilwhere itcould notcontribute
to the costs of London government. Between 1871 and 1881, the rateable value of
9 Harper, op. cit., note 8 above; and C. C. Knowles and P. H. Pitt, The history ofbuilding regulation in
London, 1189-1972, London, Architectural Press, 1972.
10 See D. Owen, ThegovernmentofVictorian London, 1855-89, Cambridge, Mass., and London, Belknap
Press of Harvard University Press, 1982, ch. 3; and F. Sheppard, London, 1808-70: the infernal tren,
London, Secker & Warburg, 1971, ch. 7.
Owen, op. cit., note 10 above, 314.
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London rose by 38 4 per cent, but between 1891 and 1901 by only 20 1 per cent.12 The
costs ofurban government had at the same time risen and the boroughs became much
more insensitive to pressure from groups of ratepayers, despite the success of the
Holloway and District Ratepayers Association in 1908. The influence ofsuch bodies
was usually curtailed by the rise ofother pressure groups such as Trades Councils; by
the creation ofa professional executive ofengineers, townclerks, and medical officers,
which eroded the independence of the councillors; and by the imposition of central
government controls. A ratepayers' backlash against higher rates had become less
likely, as had the possibility that the growth in rateable value would catch up with
expenditure.13 This would not necessarily have mattered to the owners ofsmall house
property ifthe costs ofincreased standards ofconstruction and the higher burden of
ratescould have been passed to the tenants in the form ofhigherrent, but thiswas also
ceasing to bepossible in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as the earlier
buoyancy in working-class incomes turned to stagnation.
In the last quarter ofthe nineteenth century, there had been a massive reduction in
the price of food and manufactured goods, without a corresponding reduction in
wages. The result was a marked improvement in real wages for the majority of the
urban working class, whatever exceptions there were in particular occupations.14 The
higher real income could be spent in a number of ways: on the purchase of a wider
range offoodstuffs with a higher consumption ofmeat; on new consumer goods such
as bicycles or linoleum; or on the developing commercial leisure of music halls and
sport. It could, however, also be spent on housing, for rents formed the major
exception to the fall in prices in the later nineteenth century (table 1).
TABLE 1. RENTS, PRICES AND REAL WAGES, 1870-1910
House rents Price index Real wage index
1870 100 100 100
1888 116 76 143
1898 123 71 165
1910 130 88 163
Sources: H. W. Singer, 'An index ofurban land rents and house rents in England and Wales, 1845-1913',
Econometrica, 1941, 9: 230; B. R. Mitchell and P. Deane, Abstract ofBritish historicalstatistics, Cambridge
University Press, 1962, 344-5, 472-3.
This was not the result of an increase in the profit margin of the owners; rather, it
reflected the increased standard ofaccommodation, and the ability to pass the costs
both ofhigher standardsofconstruction and rates on to the tenant. Intheory, itis true,
theoccupierand not the ownerofa small house wasliable forpaymentofthe rates, but
in many cases the landlord agreed to "compound" or to collect the rates on behalfof
the local authority as part ofthe weekly rent, in return for an allowance. In practice, it
12London County Council (LCC), London statistics, vol. 16 (1905-6), 478.
13 For an account ofthe operation ofthis backlash and its subsequent curtailment, see E. P. Hennock, Fit
andproperpersons: idea andreality in nineteenth-century urbangovernment, London, Edward Arnold, 1973;
and Offer, op. cit., note I above, 221-7.
14 See E. P. Phelps Brown with M. Browne, A century ofpa': the course ofpay andproduction in France,
Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States ofAmerica, 1860-1960, London, Macmillan,
1968.
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was not always possible for the owner to pass an increase in the rates on to the tenant,
with the result that the portion of the tenant's weekly payment that went to the
landlord was reduced. There were fluctuations in the incidence ofthe increased costs,
depending upon the state of the housing market. At a time of overbuilding and a
consequenthighlevel ofvacancies, the landlord was likely to bearthecosts; whenthere
was a tight housing market, as in the early 1890s, the tenant would be forced to do so.
In aperiod ofrisingworking-class real incomes, it was possible for tenants to bear part
of the cost and to preserve the landlords' profit margins. From the late 1890s this
changed, and there was consequently a serious decline in the profit margin of the
landlords. After 1896, prices in general started to rise and wages did not keep pace, so
that working-class real incomes stagnated until the First World War. The level of
effective demand for housing was therefore low, and this coincided with a glut in the
housing market after the building boom at the turn ofthe century. The outcome was
that the burden ofrising costs-whether construction, interest, or local taxation-fell
upon the owners.15
The opposition ofthe Holloway and District Ratepayers Association in 1908 to the
employment ofhealth visitors is therefore not surprising. The increase in the rates to
improve the health of the urban environment was in fact a capital levy upon house
owners, threatening the security they had planned when investing in this property. In
1880, rates were 16 4 percent ofthe total ofrent and rates for working-class houses in
London; in 1900, the figure was 20 3 percent.16 In Islington, the rate in the pound had
increased from around 4s. in the 1870s to 5s. in 1891, 7s. in 1901, and 8s. in 1911. The
priceofhousingmaybeexpressed as "years' purchase" ormultiples ofthe annual rent:
in Islington, the price ofhouses had fallen from 9 4 years' purchase in 1892, to 7 6 in
1902, and 4 0 in 1912.17 The cost of the improvement of the physical and social
infrastructure of Victorian and Edwardian London, which contributed to the falling
mortality ofthe capital, was met from a tax on house rents, which produced a crisis in
the housing market. The attempt to create healthy housing of a good standard of
construction connected to a piped water supply and mains drains had, because ofthe
shortcomings of the system of local taxation, produced a check to the provision of
additional accommodation, which threatened a deterioration in housing standards.
How this Edwardian crisis would have been resolved can only be a matter of
speculation, for it was overtaken by a much graver crisis during the First World War.
By 1914, the vacancies created by the building boom around 1900 had largely been
taken up, and thisproduced theprecondition for a rise in rents and a possible recovery
in profit margins, even if at the risk of imposing serious strain on tenants faced by
stagnating real wages. As it was, this free-market mechanism of recovery from a
cyclical downturn was aborted by the rent controls introduced by the government in
1915; even if the Edwardian crisis were merely cyclical rather than a permanent
15 M. J. Daunton, House and home in the Victorian citY.: wvorking-class housing, 1850-1914, London,
Edward Arnold, 1983, 215.
16 Offer, op. cit., note I above, 290-2, 311; PP, 1905, LXXXIV, Second series ofmemoranda, statistical
tables and charts prepared in the Board of Trade with reference to various matters bearing on British and
foreign trade and industrial conditions.
17 Offer, op. cit., note I above, 270.
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structural change in the housing market, it soon changed its character. Whether a free
market solution would have been possible can, however, only be a matter of mere
speculation: thedeterioration in profitmargins might have gone too far; and the fiscal
problem might not have been solved.18 What is undoubtedly true is that, before 1914,
the interests ofsmall property owners had been neglected and they were forced to bear
the burden oftheimprovements in thepublic health ofLondon. It isworthaskingwhy
this should have been the case.
House owners were, ofcourse, aware oftheir plight, and wereconscious that purely
localvictoriessuchasthatatIslingtonin 1908 werenotenough: whatwasneededwas a
change in taxation policy at Westminster rather than the frustration of the Medical
Officer of Health in Islington. There were, however, difficulties in the way of a
widening of the political stage, arising both from the characteristics of the property
owners themselves and from the terms of the political debate in which they were
obliged to participate. The nature of the investment as local, concrete, and secure
indicated a limitation of horizon which was political as well as economic; it was an
expression ofa dominant localism that could not adjust to the need for a movement
away from the older strategy ofratepayers' backlash on the local council and towards
mobilization at Westminster. In any case, the petty bourgeoisie of England had
supported a laissezfaire ideology in the early nineteenth century as part ofan attack
upon the privileges and limitations that seemed to deny them political and economic
rights. This was aview ofthe state as biased and parasitical, and generally itcontinued
to beheldbyorganized property owners throughoutthenineteenth century. Theywere
accordingly opposed to state intervention and municipal socialism, although it could
be argued that intervention on their behalfwas precisely what they needed. The state
was viewed as a hostile agency and not as something that could be used for their own
ends. This forms a contrast with Germany, where later industrialization allowed the
longersurvival ofpre-industrial corporate bodies ofsmall traders, whiletheearlier rise
of large-scale concerns created an opponent to be fought by appeals to the state.19
This weakness ofthe position ofBritish owners ofhouse propertywasintensified by
the problems that arose from the terms set by the political debate which developed
from the 1880s.20 The Liberalscame to seethe solution tothefiscalproblem as a tax on
land. The builders and owners of the houses were considered to be productive and
enterprising, whereas the owners ofland were felt to be parasitical, imposing a burden
on others in the form ofhigh land prices created not by their own efforts, but by the
generalexpansion oftheeconomy. Thiswasan "unearned increment" whichshould be
taxed out of existence, providing an alternative source of income for urban
government that would relieve house property ofits burden. This was to prove to be
impractical, for theshareofthe national incomeaccruing to land was notlargeenough
18 Daunton, op. cit., note 15 above, ch. 12; Offer, op. cit., note I above, argues for a permanent structural
change.
19 G. J. Crossick, 'Urban society and the petty bourgeoisie in nineteenth-century Britain', in Fraser and
Sutcliffe (eds), op. cit., note 7 above, 307-26; and idem, 'The emergence ofthe lowermiddle class in Britain:
a discussion', in G. J. Crossick (ed.), The lower middle class in Britain, 1870-1914, London, Croom Helm,
1977, 39-48.
20 These comments are based on Offer, op. cit., note I above.
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to bear the burden proposed by the Liberals, and it was difficult to value land
separately from the buildings erected on it. The policy certainly had a limited appeal
to most house owners, who in many cases were themselves the owners of the plots
upon which the houses were erected. Even in London, where the leasehold system was
preponderant and the owners of land and building were usually different, there was
more co-operation than conflict. The organized property owners were more inclined
to side with the landowners than against them as the Liberals had assumed they
would. The main importance ofthe Liberal campaign against landowners was that it
diverted attention from the solutions that the house owners would have preferred,
such as a local income tax or a greater reliance upon central government for funds,
both ofwhich would have broadened the tax base. Nor did the Conservatives come to
the protection ofthe house owners. Salisbury's government neglected urban interests
in its reforms of the taxation system, providing instead relief for the Church and
agriculture; there was a disinclination to protect an unpopular element of property.
Rather than come to the aid ofthe small property owners in Edwardian Britain, some
Conservative opponents of the Liberal land campaign were advocating council
housing: the solution to the discrepancy between healthy housing and profit, between
housing as a residence and a source of taxation, seemed to be to remove it from the
private sector.
Public health reform and pressure for improved housing must therefore be seen
against this background ofan unresolved dilemma oflocal taxation which created the
spectacle described by Alderman Mills. The problem was, as Dr Offer has said,
Ifthe production ofgoods and the maintenance oflabour were to be kept at a level of
competitive efficiency, urban conditions had to be ameliorated and improved.
Revenue for local rates fell short of satisfying these pressing requirements but
taxation of houses was already high enough to choke off the market supply of new
housing and cause existing accommodation to be run down.2'
II
The concern for the housing of London, which had surfaced in Andrew Mearns's
The bitter cry of outcast London, arose from specific problems in one part of the
London housing market, in what would now be called the inner city, the band
between the expanding business district and the new suburbs. It was a world, as
described by Mearns, of"pestilential human rookeries", in which dilapidated houses
were subdivided so that "every room in these rotten and reeking tenements houses a
family, often two", resulting in overcrowding and all kinds ofsexual immorality and
vice. His starting-point was the impossibility of evangelizing the poor who lived in
such conditions: his concern was primarily with moral health rather than physical
health.22 The pamphlet marked the start of a major debate in the 1880s about the
housing of London's poor, and it might be wondered why this was the case. Bad
housing conditions were, after all, not a novel feature ofthe metropolis, and concern
had often been expressed during the previous half-century.
21 Ibid., 310.
22Wohi (ed.), Andrew Mearns, op. cit., note 3 above.
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What was at stake was in part a relative deterioration ofinner London, a failure to
share in the general improvement in housing conditions experienced in most large
towns since the 1860s. Indeed, certain parts ofinner London seem to haveexperienced
an absolute decline in standards, measured in terms of persons per house (table 2).
TABLE 2. PERSONS PER HOUSE IN SELECTED AREAS OF LONDON, 1841-81
1841 1861 1881
Holborn: St George's 8 6 104 11 4
Bethnal Green: Green 60 7 1 7 9
St George in the East: St John's 6 2 9-8 10 3
Source. Stedman Jones, Outcast London, op. cit., note 3 above, 176
Thismightbecomparedwith an area such asTyneside, whosehousingconditions were
as bad as London's but where there was some optimism about the situation: in 1854,
65 3 percentoffamilies inNewcastle lived in subdivided tenements and 34-7 percentin
self-contained houses and flats; by 1883-5, the figures were reversed at 35-7 and 64 3
percentrespectively.23 Inner London stood outfrom thenational trend away from the
subdivision of existing housing (which had marked urbanization in the early
nineteenth century) and towards self-contained property. In some ways, the problem
seemed to be intensified in the 1880s, and its scale meant that it could not, as in
provincial towns, be treated as a regrettable but isolated incident in the general
improvement of housing conditions. How is this situation to be explained?
It was the product ofa number of factors in both the housing and labour markets
that were either peculiar to London or particularly intense, which came together in an
unprecedented way in the 1880s to create a crisis for the casual poor. Employment in
London had anumberofpeculiaritieswhichmustberemembered inanyanalysisofthe
housingmarket.24Therewere, ofcourse, manymenwithregularemploymentandhigh
wages: civil servants, clerks in the various financial and commercial firms ofthe City,
workers forthe railwaycompanies, skilledcraftsmen ofvarious sorts. There was also a
unique mixture offunctions which created a large casual labour market that trapped
the population of the inner city in a limited and shrinking stock of expensive and
poor-quality housing. London was the major port in the country; it was the centre for
conspicuous consumption bythecourt, thearistocracy, rentiers, andall thoseattracted
to thecapital for business and pleasure; and it remained amajorindustrial centre. The
trade which passed through the port was seasonal, depending upon the harvest for
various crops such as wheat or the opening ofthe Baltic for timber. There were also
shorter-term irregularities in the demand for labour, depending upon the arrival of
vessels. The unloading ofships was a labour-intensive process, and the employers of
waterfrontlabourengaged workersasrequired tomeettheirimmediateneeds. In order
to ensure that there was never a shortage ofmen at the peak ofactivity, they retained a
23 Daunton, op. cit., note 15 above, 20.
24 On thelabourmarket inLondon, see E. J. Hobsbawm, 'Thenineteenth-century Londonlabourmarket',
in R. Glass et al. (eds), London: aspects ofchange, London, 1964; Stedman Jones, op. cit., note 3 above,
part 1; and above all, Charles Booth, Life andlabour ofthepeople ofLondon, London, Macmillan, 1902, 17
vols.
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pool oflabour by sharing work among its members during periods oflower activity.
The result was underemployment oflabour, intensified by the fact that the men who
formed the core ofthe dock work-force would be augmented by other workers who
could not find employment in their normal trade. This seasonality and irregularity of
employment on the waterfront was aggravated by the seasonality in other major
sectors such as building, where men were laid offin the winter. These were problems
sharedbyotherlargeportsrelyingupontheimportation ofseasonal primary products,
such as Liverpool, whose workers therefore faced a comparable housing problem: the
need to beclose to thewaterfront forengagement at short notice and for shortperiods;
an irregular pattern ofearnings that made it difficult to rent a house in an area where
regular payment ofrentwasrequired; and the necessity to bepart ofa local network of
credit, which limited mobility. The uniqueness of London was the addition of two
other features.
The demands of London as a centre of conspicuous consumption were also
irregular, dependingupontheSeason.25Thearrivalinthemetropolisofthearistocracy
for the spring and early summer, with its round of balls and receptions, created
demands for house furnishings and decorations, for servants and coachmen, for
millinersanddressmakers, whichaffected asizeablepartofthe Londonlabourmarket.
The goods and services required were highly personalized, and it was not possible to
produce them ahead ofdemand in order to create steady employment. London was in
this respect unlike most northern industrial towns where the production ofgoods in
factories was more regular, depending upon the trade cycle in the world economy
rather than the immediate short-term demands ofclients. This pattern ofproduction
was not, however, confined to the luxury trades which were such a feature of the
London economy; it also applied to a large extent to the industries that served the bulk
of the population of London.
The metropolis had the largest concentration ofconsumers in the country, and this
would make theproduction ofgoods in large runs on a regular basis perfectly feasible,
unlike in the luxury trades where the pattern ofdemand made it impossible. Such an
outcome was, however, inhibited by other aspects of London's economy. London
could not compete with the Midlands and the North, where cheaper land and coal
allowed the development offactories which had an incentive to produce on a regular
basis in order to earn a return on the capital investment. Many trades such as
boot-making and textiles had accordingly left London. Where the metropolis could
compete was in trades based upon production at home or in sweat-shops, which
minimized expenditure upon power and space, and passed the burdens ofadjustment
to fluctuations in demand on to a work-force that could be engaged and dismissed
atwill.26 As in thecaseofthedocks, this tied workers to the innercitywhere such work
wasavailable; indeed, thesevarious forms ofcasualwork wereoften related, forcasual
employment for the husband often meant outwork for the wife.
This labour market, which relied upon an interrelationship ofsectors with different
seasonal patterns, was threatened in the 1880s.27 The extension ofprovincial factory
25 L. Davidoff, The best circles: Society, etiquette and the Season, London, Croom Helm, 1973.
26 D. Bythell, The sweated trades: outwork in nineteenth-century Britain, London, Batsford, 1978.
27 Stedman Jones, op. cit., note 3 above, 153.
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production in areas such as ready-made clothing meant competition for London
trades; the movement of dock-work further downstream undermined older
communities; and the expansion of the City's office district curtailed the inner
industrial areas. The result was an intensification ofthe poverty ofthe population of
the inner city which was not able to move to new areas, and an attempt by employers
to compete with theirprovincial rivals by an intensification ofsweating. To this strain
in the labour market of inner London was added tension in the housing market.
The housing stock ofthe inner districts was shrinking, for two reasons. Partly it was
a result of commercial development, with the construction of railways, docks,
warehouses, and offices. But it was also the outcome ofthe conscious policies ofthe
previous twenty orthirty years forsanitary and social reform. New streets were driven
through the slum districts, to displace the poor and so reduce the charge on the rates;
to open the "rookeries" to inspection and control; and to produce "a freercirculation
of air [which] would tend materially to extirpate those prevalent diseases which not
only ravaged the poorer districts in question, but were also dangerous to the adjacent
localities".28
This approach had serious limitations, for it was essentially a sanitary policy
applied to individual houses or pockets of property, rather than a housing policy
concerned with the processes that created poor conditions. The housing problem was
defined in terms ofslums which were seen as distinct from the rest ofthe urban fabric,
produced by the faults of the past rather than the failings of the current urban
economy. The policy was to excise these "plague spots", which could be defined by
the Medical Officers of Health by the death rate and the incidence of disease. The
owners ofthe slums should becompensated in full, since it wasbelieved that they were
innocent legatees of the mistakes of the past and not the authors of the poor
conditions; and new housing could be left to the free market, aided by philanthropy,
under the guidance of regulations designed to prevent the recurrence of insanitary
conditions. The problem was not seen as residing in the distribution of income, the
structure ofthe labour market, or the nature ofurban industry. The Sanitary Act of
1866 made overcrowding an offence; the Artizans and Labourers Dwellings Act of
1868 allowed local authorities to condemn and demolish insanitary houses; and the
Artizans and Labourers Dwellings Improvement Act of 1875 extended these powers
to districts. Although some powers of rebuilding were contained in the legislation,
they were limited; furthermore, ifthey were used, the people rehoused were often not
those who had been displaced, for they could not afford the rents charged in the new
property. The implementation ofthese measures rested upon the Medical Officers of
Health ofthe metropolis, whose appointment by each local authority in London had
been required by the Metropolis Local Mangement Act of 1855.29 The approach was
not without its problems.
The Medical Officers faced two difficulties. One arose from the fact that their
tenure ofoffice was at the pleasure ofthe Vestry, which might limit their ability to act
28 Ibid., ch. 8; H. J. Dyos, 'Some social costs ofrailway buildingin London', J. Transport Hist., 1957-8, 3:
23-30; Owen, op. cit., note 10 above, ch. 5. The quotation is from Stedman Jones, op. cit., note 3 above,
166-7, citing a Select Committee of 1838.
29 Wohl, Eternal slum, op. cit., note 3 above, chs 4 and 5; J. A. Yelling, Slums and slum clearance in
Victorian London, London, Allen & Unwin, 1986.
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against the interests of property owners. The second problem arose from a growing
realization ofthe limitations ofthe legislation. The connection between overcrowding
and disease was obvious to the medical officers. Dr Buchanan, medical officer of St
Giles, remarked in 1857,
Ifyou were asked to name a single condition which shall produce at once an excess of
zymotic diseases, an excess ofconsumption and lung diseases, and a larger infantile
mortality, the answer is ready and inevitable. You may produce these diseases with
most certainty ... ifyou will only crowd your population together so that they shall
breathe sufficiently impure air.
Overcrowding and disease, remarked the Medical Officer of Health for the Strand,
"mutually act and react upon each other". It was not clear, however, that the use of
legislation at their disposal would be ofany assistance: to attack overcrowding in one
place might at best merely displace it, and at worst intensify the problem by reducing
the stock of cheap accommodation. Displacement might, for some Vestries and
Medical Officers, be desirable: their problem had been solved and the rate burden ofa
poor population contained. The Medical Officer for St Giles, a reception area for the
population displaced from the City, used the legislation to force them to move on,
and he remarked to the Select Committee considering the impact ofthe legislation in
1881 that he "was pleased to have got rid of them". This was no consolation for the
districts south of the Thames and Hammersmith, to which he indicated that the
displaced population had moved.30
Even the use of powers of inspection that did not reduce the housing stock, and
might produce cleansing, whitewashing and repairs, was not without its problems. It
is possible that such sanitary inspections did contribute to a reduction in disease, but
some Medical Officers were aware that they needed to contain their zeal. Dr Tripe,
the Medical Officer of Hackney, explained the problem:
There is considerable doubt in my mind as to the extent to which the Regulations
should be enforced in providing and keeping sanitary arranagements ofthe poor in an
efficient state, as iffrequent inspections are made, and the owners and rent-collectors
are put to comparatively a large expense, the ordinary rent, which could with
difficulty be paid, is increased, and ifthe additional rent be not paid, the tenants are
ejected, to carry a bad example elsewhere ... on the other hand, ifdue regard be not
paid to the sanitary arrangements. disease may arise in the streets and spread to
the adjoining neighbourhood.
Tripe saw the problem as one of the tenants rather than the property: if landlords
were forced to repair property which was then misused, "no reasonable rent will pay
the cost"; the answer seemed to be to teach the "destructive poor" to reform their
habits. He preferred not to use the powers ofthe Act of 1866, which would only have
resulted, he remarked, in 10,000 people sleeping in the street.31 By the 1880s, most
Medical Officers had moved from the narrow parochialism of Dr Buchanan to a
30 These opinions ofthe medical officers are from Wohl, Eternalslum, op. cit., note 3 above, 109 18; and
Stedman Jones, op. cit., note 3 above, 189- 90.
' Ibid., 192-3; Wohl, Eternal slum, op. cit., note 3 above, 117-18.
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wider appreciation of the consequences of implementing legislation which had been
seen as a victory of sanitary reform against the self-interest or indifference of the
Vestries.
The assumption behind the "plague spot" approach to housing policy was that the
problem of poor conditions did not arise from the nature of the present urban
economy, and that the demolition of the mistakes of the past would permit the free
market or the five-per-cent philanthropy of such bodies as the Peabody Trust to
provide the necessary accommodation at unsubsidized rents, showing that good
sanitation and a fair return to capital could be combined. In fact, the implementation
of the policy clashed with reality. Slums could not be so easily defined as separate
"plague spots" distinct from the rest of the urban fabric, for the areas designated by
the Medical Officers contained high-value commercial property and factories. The
generous terms of compensation also led to high costs for cleared land, which
prevented private enterprise and five-per-cent philanthropy from providing adequate
replacement housing. Rents were too high for the residents who had been displaced,
and the strict regulations of the block dwellings that were erected were unpopular
with many families. The housing policy which had emerged in the 1860s and 1870s
started to face increased pressure by the late nineteenth century.32
The emphasis upon excising "plague spots" was associated with the assumption
that it was the character of the poor which was crucial, rather than the nature of
employment and industry, or the relationship between rent and wages. This
perception was embedded in the stress of five-per-cent philanthropy that rents in the
new block dwellings should be paid regularly and the residents' behaviour monitored.
It was also expressed in the strategy of taking over existing dwellings and "training"
the poor in sanitation and good housekeeping. This was the approach ofOctavia Hill
and her lady rent collectors, who visited their tenants to instil habits ofpunctuality in
rent payment and to enforce cleanliness. "The people's homes are bad", wrote Miss
Hill, "partly because they are badly built and arranged; they are tenfold worse
because the tenants' habits and lives are what they are. Transplant them tomorrow to
healthy and commodious homes, and they would pollute and destroy them." The
scheme should be made to yield five per cent in order to encourage commercial
landlords to imitate her approach, and to avoid the demoralization ofthe poor.33 The
impact of such schemes on the housing stock was, of course, minimal, both directly
and in terms of imitation. The emphasis upon "moralizing" the tenants was part of
the approach associated with the Charity Organisation Society, which stressed that
social problems had an individual basis: the need was to teach the poor to cope
through their own resources with the insecurities of life; those who failed because of
their fecklessness should be treated in a draconian and punitive manner.34 The moral
32 Yelling, op. cit., note 29 above; J. White, Rothschild Buildings: lite in an East End tenenmetnt block,
1887-1920, London and Boston, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980, 54 60; Wohl, Eternalslum. op. cit.. note 3
above, ch. 6; J. Tarn, Fivieper centphilanthropy: an account ol housing in urban areas between 1840 and 1914,
Cambridge University Press, 1973.
33 Wohl, Eternalslum, op. cit., note 3 above, ch. 7; 0. Hill, Homes ofthe Londonpoor, London, 1875, cited
in White, op. cit., note 32 above, 54.
34C. L. Mowat, The Chairity Organisation Society, 1869 1913: its idleas and w1orks, London, Methuen,
1961.
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disease of individuals should be treated as well as the sanitary shortcomings of their
accommodation.
The dominant approach by the 1880s was to consider the house as an artefact that
might be more or less sanitary and to view the tenant as a moral problem. Ifthe house
were insanitary, it should be demolished; if the tenant had been demoralized or
degenerated by urban living, he should be re-educated. The solutions which emerged
from the debate ofthe 1880s over "outcast London" did not mean, as some historians
imply, a shift from these attitudes towards an acceptance of the provision of public
housing at subsidized rents as the means of allowing tenants sufficient
accommodation to prevent overcrowding. The massive research of Charles Booth
that resulted in The life and labour ofthe people ofLondon was one response to the
problems ofLondon in the 1880s, yet he treated the poorest inhabitants ofLondon in
much the same way as the Medical Officer of St Giles: they should be removed from
London rather than a single parish, and placed in labour colonies where their
character might be reformed. This approach owed much to the attitudes which had
been dominant up to the 1880s: it still rested upon personal morality and the excision
of"plague spots" rather than the structural causes ofpoverty and poor housing. The
removal of Londoners in Booth's lowest class would, by taking them out of
competition for work and houses with the classes above them, allow the conditions of
those who remained to improve within a free and unregulated market. Alfred
Marshall agreed: he aimed to remove the existing surplus population to a colony
outside London, and to prevent further undesirable immigrants by strict control of
the bottom end of the housing market through tight sanitary regulations. The
removal ofthe "superfluous labour" would, he argued, "compel rich London to pay,
as it can well afford to do, high enough wages to cover the cost of good
accommodation", so that "the car ofprogress may roll on till every one in London is
properly housed, and every house has adequate free space around it". The solution
was one of "helping the feeble and timid to move and carry their work with them",
leaving only such work as it was strictly necessary to locate in London. The result
would be a strict state regulation ofa residuum ofsociety, in order to preserve a free
market for the respectable working class.35
The other major theme in the debate ofthe 1880s was the land question, which was
given added impetus with the appearance of Henry George's Progress andpoverty in
1880. The Liberals had long blamed the system of short leases for the severity of the
housing problem in London, a point which had been analysed at inconclusive length
by the Select Committee on Town Holdings and which was also considered by the
Royal Commission on the Housing ofthe Working Classes. The view of the radicals
was that in explaining poverty and insanitary housing, "the diabolus ex machina was
the great ground landlord". Short leases were seen as an unnatural perversion of the
market, brought about by the ability of monopoly landowners to impose their will;
they were able, by hoarding land, to force up prices, which consequently led to high
35 ForBooth, see E. P. Hennock, 'Povertyand social theoryin England: theexperienceofthe 1880s', Social
Hist., 1976, 1: 67-91; and J. Brown, 'Charles Booth and the labour colonies, 1889-1905', Econ. Hist. Rev.,
2nd ser., 1968, 21: 349-60. For Marshall, see his contribution to the debate on The bitter cry: 'The housing
of the London poor. I-Where to house them', Contemporary Rev., 1884, 45: 224-31.
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rents; and as property neared the date of reversion to the ground landlord, it was
allowed to deteriorate, often falling into the hands of "house farmers" who sought
high returns without regard for the maintenance of the house during the fag-end of
the lease. These attacks upon landowners were always susceptible to criticism, for it
was by no means obvious that short leases did produce poor housing, as the examples
of Mayfair and Bloomsbury suggested. It could, on the contrary, be argued that the
ground landlords had a vested interest in maintaining property in good condition so
that it had a high value on reversion. The contribution ofGeorge was that he moved
the argument to a different level, away from leases in particular to an attack on land
in general. He argued that the increased value ofland was produced by the activity of
society in general and that this formed an "unearned increment". If this were
removed, lower land prices would allow cheaper housing and, together with a
garden-city type of layout, permit lower-density development. Healthy housing and
the demise of overcrowding therefore seemed to depend upon an assault upon the
landowners, and this was the view adopted by the Liberal government of 1906-14. It
was an attempt that was to end in disillusion and disappointment.36
Although the "land question" was asked from the 1880s to the First World War,
there were other changes in approach to the social problems of London associated
with housing of the casual poor. The draconian solutions favoured by Booth and
Marshall gave way to one which saw the casual poor as part of the structure of the
labour market in its entirety, rather than a separate moral problem. This arose in part
from the practical difficulties ofimplementing the policy prescription ofthe 1860s and
1870s. The policy of the Liberal government of 1906-14 towards the labour market
was to introduce minimum wages and trade boards to regulate the rates in the
sweated trades, preventing trades from being "parasitical" by reducing the efficiency
oflabour and forcing families to rely upon supplemental earnings from other family
members. This perception arose in part from an extrapolation of Henry George's
notion of rent from land to other forms of income: if landowners could receive
"unearned income" at the expense ofthe rest ofsociety, could it not be the case that
the owners ofsweatshops were benefiting at the expense ofother members ofsociety,
who bore the costs of ill health and unemployment of the sweated workers? The
answer was to make the labour market more efficient, so that all workers received the
full value oftheir labour. It was hoped to remove casual employment by introducing
labour exchanges, which would allow men to find work rather than relying upon
those employers where they were known; the employers in turn could be certain of
finding men when they were needed and so would not need to retain a pool to meet
the maximum demand. Such approaches were themselves limited, for they rested
upon a belief that the problem was one of organization, that if the labour market
could be made more efficient there would be no unemployment. The main advocate
36 Offer, op. cit., note I above, is the best account ofthe reception ofGeorge and the genesis ofthe land
campaign; on the earlier debate on leases, see D. A. Reeder, 'The politics of urban leaseholds in late
Victorian Britain', International Rev. soc. Hist., 1962, 6: 413-30. On London, see F. Banfield, The great
landlords ofLondon, London, Spencer Blackett, 1881?; and H. Lazarus, Landlordism: an illustration ofthe
rise andspreadofslumlandas evincedon thegreat estates ofthe great ground landlords ofLondon, London,
General Publishing Co., 1982: the quotation is from p. 5.
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ofthis view, W. H. Beveridge, refused to accept that there could ever be an excess of
labour and he denied J. A. Hobson's argument, that demand could be deficient. This
recognition nevertheless constituted a major intellectual shift from about 1900. These
approaches were to some extent seen as the solution to the housing problem: more
regular earnings would permit working-men to rent better-quality housing; and
subsidized housing was not required as a solution to the problem ofovercrowding. If
wages could be increased and rents reduced by the use of cheap land, then a free
market in housing could continue. The extent to which this approach was viable, in
view of the low level of building before the First World War, is, of course,
controversial, and the LCC had already before 1914 started to move away from the
sanitary approach of slum clearance and rehousing in such schemes as Boundary
Street to the provision ofadditional housing on suburban sites such as at White Hart
Lane, Tottenham. Perhaps there was already in train an inevitable progression
towards such massive council schemes as Becontree and the provision of subsidized
accommodation; but in 1914 there could have been no expectation of such massive
intervention as was to come in 1919.37
III
The housing ofinner London can appear as a record ofinadequate responses to an
intractable problem, and historians have considered this in most detail, perhaps
because they see in this debate the seeds of the massive public intervention of the
interwar period. By contrast, the new housing of an improving standard which was
built in the surburbs has received much less attention. Overcrowding in London and
the ratio of persons to houses continued to deteriorate until the 1890s, when there
were signs that the situation which had seemed so serious and alarming during the
debate on The bitter cry ofoutcast London had stabilized, with hints ofimprovement.
The person-to-house density, a very crude measure of housing standards, had risen
from 7 72 in 1851, to 7 85 in 1881 and 8 02 in 1896. However, between the censuses of
1891 and 1911 there was some fall in the level ofovercrowding.38 The problems in the
property market which appeared in Edwardian London might have checked building,
but it must be remembered that one factor which created the fall in values and profits
was the inability to increase rents because of the large number of houses produced
during the housing boom at the turn ofthe century and the consequent high level of
vacancies.
House building was highly cyclical, marked by periods of intensive speculative
activity succeeded by long periods oflow activity. This produced alternating periods
of shortages marked by rising rents and sharing of accommodation, and gluts when
the tenants could expect a reduction in rents or use their bargaining position to secure
a better house or force a landlord to make improvements in order to keep his property
37 Yelling, op. cit., note 29 above. There is an extensive literature on thechanging attitudes towards social
policy: see, for example, M. Freeden, The new libralism: an ideology ofsocial reform, Oxford, Clarendon
Press, 1978; and P. F. Clarke, Liberals andsocial democrats, Cambridge University Press, 1979. The work
ofthe LCC is described in LCC, Housing ofthe working classes in London: notes on the action taken between
1855 and 1912for the better housing ofthe working classes in London, with special reference to the action
taken by the London County Council between the years 1889 and 1912, London, 1913.
38 Wohl, Eternal slum, op. cit., note 3 above, 300-3.
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in occupancy. Thus in West Ham, the average weekly rent fell from 7 2s. in 1888 to a
minimum of6&9s. in 1891, rising to a peak of8 4s. in 1903, before falling back to 7 2s.
in 1905. E. G. Howarth and M. Wilson, who studied the management of house
property in this area, found that agents reduced rents or allowed arrears in order to
retain good tenants and to minimize the loss on empty homes.39 The experience ofthe
inner city can all too easily lead to a view ofworking-class housing in London based
upon a continuing battle between defaulting and destructive tenants on the one hand
and rapacious landlords on the other. Much morecharacteristic ofthe social relations
of housing in London was its relative tranquillity. The building cycle did give the
advantage alternately to tenants and landlords, but these swings were expressed
through the ability to adjust rents or to secure repairs, not by major tensions that
threatened the stability of urban society.
The condition ofhousing did not only rely upon the ability ofbuilders to keep pace
with the population: it was also necessary to consider the provision ofservices to the
houses and changes in the furnishings. Perhaps the most important in terms ofhealth
was the extension of a piped water supply. In London in 1888, the daily domestic
water consumption was 26-3 gallons per capita in the area of the East London
Company, 28 1 gallons in the district served by the Southwark and Vauxhall
Company, and 33 gallons in the case of the Grand Junction Company. Houses were
invariably connected to a piped water supply, which permitted the extension of
water-closets, and so contributed to the reduction of typhoid fever, diarrhoea, and
enteric fever. The other majorchange in domestic technology was the spread ofgas to
the majority of working-class houses. The crucial development was the slot-meter,
which allowed working-class customers to pay for their gas in advance in small
amounts, rather than quarterly in arrears. The South Metropolitan Company started
to install slot-meters in London in 1892, and by theend of 1898 had fitted 80,115. The
working-class demand for gas increased rapidly, and in the South Metropolitan
district reached an average of 16,000 cubic feet a year or an eighth ofconsumption in
the district. The gas companies incurred the costs ofsupplying pipes, fittings, meters,
and stoves: the Gas Light and Coke Company invested over £05m between 1892 and
1898. The spread ofthe gas-meter was also associated with an extension in the use of
gas for cooking: in the case of the South Metropolitan Company, the percentage of
consumers supplied with gas-meters rose from 44 5 in 1898 to 70 0 in 1910, and the
percentage with gas-cookers from 64 0 to 79 4. Furthermore, the cost of gas for
lighting fell as a result ofthe introduction in the 1890s ofthe Welsbach incandescent
mantle, which required only a quarter ofthe gas for a given level ofillumination. The
consumption of paraffin, the main source of light in working-class houses by the
1880s, started to fall. What gas had not yet started to change was heating, which still
relied upon coal. It had, however, allowed working-class houses to become better lit
and more pleasant in the summer when the coal range was not needed for cooking.40
39 E. G. Howarth and M. Wilson, West Ham. astudy in socialandindustrialproblems, being the report of
the Outer London Inquiry Committee, London, Dent, 1907, 61-2, 116-17, table III; on the building cycle,
S. B. Saul, 'House building in England, 1890-1914', Econ. Hist Rev., 2nd ser., 1962-3, 15: 119-37.
40 The changes in water and gas are discussed in Daunton, op. cit., note 15 above, ch. 10.
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These changes in domestic technology were associated with a marked rise in
expectation among the tenants ofworking-class houses during the last quarter ofthe
nineteenth century which, according to some historians, saw the emergence ofa new
culture of domesticity. This was in part a positive response to the new opportunities
given by the marked increase in real wages, and in part a defensive retreat in the face
of the undermining of traditional work-place cultures as a result of increases in
productivity in response to the falling profit margins ofthe late nineteenth century.41
In his recollections of South London, Fred Willis remarked upon the creation of a
"best" room to provide a fitting stage for the new goods. "There is something almost
sacred about this choice apartment", he wrote. "One has a nightmare vision of a
prancing bronze horse, a silent and motionless clock, mighty 'ornaments' of a
funereal nature and glass lustres, a suite of red plush furniture, what-nots, wooden
shelves with tortuous carvings, carpet, rug and a piano which nobody plays." The
room and its contents were not designed for everyday use, but had an almost sacred
and symbolic function for special occasions.42 More important in terms ofhealth was
the use of cheap floor- and wall-coverings. Machine-printing of wallpaper was
developed by 1851, and the duty was removed in 1861. Linoleum was produced in
1876, and was soon used in working-class households. The ability of working-class
families to purchase these coverings possibly contributed to the reduction in
tuberculosis, although the new consumer goods were as much "incontrovertible
evidence of character and position" as contributions to the health of housing.43
There was not only an improvement in domestic technology at the end of the
nineteenth century, but also in transport, which freed the regularly-employed from
residence in the centre of London. The introduction of cheap fares, particularly in
north-eastern London with the implementation ofthe Cheap Trains Act of 1883, and
the provision of horse and later electric trams, gave access to cheaper land in the
suburbs. The annual number ofjourneys per person on railways, trams, and buses
rose from 68 5 at the time of the debate on "outcast London" in 1884, to 128 7 in
1901. This was a major contribution to the health of London. Changes in
metropolitan transport, by breaking the stranglehold which had developed in the
1880s in the housing market ofinner London, had a role second only to sanitation in
improving housing conditions.44
Improvement there certainly was at the end of the century, yet the relationship
between rents and wages in London remained more unfavourable than almost
anywhere else in England,4s and, although most of the new houses were self-
contained and designed for occupation by a single family, sub-letting was extremely
41 G. Stedman Jones, 'Working-class culture and working-class politics in London, 1870-1900: notes on
the remaking of a working-class', J. soc. Hist., 1973-4, 7: 460-508.
42 F. Willis, 101 Jubilee Road: a book ofLondon yesterdays, London, Phoenix House, 1948, 102-3.
43 Some of these changes are described in W. H. Fraser, The coming of the mass market, 1850-1914,
London, Macmillan, 1981. The quotation is from M. E. Loane, An Englishman's castle, London, Edward
Arnold, 1909, 55.
44 Stedman Jones, op. cit., note 3 above, 234; A. S. Wohl, 'The housing oftheworking classes in London,
1815-1914', in S. D. Chapman (ed.), The history ofworking-class housing: a symposium, Newton Abbot,
David & Charles, 1971, 29-33.
45 Rentsandwages in London and provincial towns aregiven in PP 1908 CVII, Report ofanenquiri' hi the
Board of Trade into working-class rents, housing and retail prices.
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common. In 1911, 710 per cent of the population of London county were either
renting or letting shared accommodation, a figure surpassed only by Plymouth (83 4
percent) and Devonport (90 6 percent).46 Overcrowding, defined as the percentage of
the population living at a density ofmore than two persons per room, was also higher
than in provincial towns, with the exception ofsome in north-east England (table 3).
TABLE 3. PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION IN PRIVATE FAMILIES LIVING OVER TWO PER
ROOM, 1911
London county 17-8
Finsbury 39-8 Gateshead 33 7
Shoreditch 36 6 Newcastle 31 6
Islington 200 Plymouth 17 5
Camberwell 13 5 Leeds 11 0
Stoke Newington 8 8 Liverpool 10 1
Wandsworth 6-3 Blackburn 44
Source: Census ofEngland and Wales, 1911, vol. 8, table 3
The continuance of the serious pressure on housing in the inner city must be
explained by the survival into the Edwardian period of the problems of the casual
labour market, and a pattern of high prices for land wanted for other uses, which
made the construction ofworking-class housing in these areas difficult. Despite the
improvement that had taken place in London's housing, there were still serious
problems in certain areas. Yet the more appropriate comparison is not with the
provincial towns ofEngland: it is with the other great metropolises and capitals ofthe
industrial world. On this criterion, the point which stands out is the high standard of
accommodation in London in comparison with Berlin, or Paris, or Vienna, or New
York where the real cost ofhousing was higher and the level ofovercrowding greater.
Whether the relative level of housing costs and standards affected the patterns of
mortality in these cities, or whether there were other factors which could compensate
for the influence ofaccommodation, is a question that raises many issues for urban
and demographic historians to consider in the future.47
46 Census ofEngland and Wales, 191 1, vol 6, table 2.
47 See the collection of essays which considers housing conditions but which does not analyse the
demographic consequences: M. J. Daunton (ed.), Housing the workers, 1850-1914: a comparative history,
Leicester University Press, 1990; see also D. J. Olsen, The city as a work ofart. London, Paris, Vienna, New
Haven, Conn., and London, Yale University Press, 1986.
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